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When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe visited then US President-elect 
Donald Trump in November 2016, he 
presented Trump with a Honmas Beres 
S-05 golf driver embellished with gold and 
intended, apparently, ‘for players seeking 
a higher trajectory and slice correction.’ 
The clubs were well received (even if, as 
it turned out, they were made in China). 
So when the two leaders met again in 
February 2017, they played golf together 
and spent five hours discussing United 
States-Japan relations. 
Abe has therefore received strong 
marks for his Trump diplomacy, with 
subsequent opinion polling suggesting 
that 70 per cent of Japanese were 
satisfied with the results of the Trump-
Abe meeting. For Abe, such statecraft 
recreates the successful golf diplomacy 
pursued by his grandfather, Nobusuke 
Kishi, as Japanese Prime Minister. Kishi 
golfed with US President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower during alliance negotiations in 
the 1950s. So does Abe’s golden golf gift 
represent a new diplomatic triumph for 
Japan? In answering this, it is important 
to ask two further questions. How do 
Trump’s foreign policies affect Japan’s 
interests? And what can Abe do through 
diplomacy to address these effects? 
Trump’s challenge to Japanese 
interests
On the first question, it is clear that 
Trump’s policies challenge Japan in both 
security and economic terms. Security-
wise, Trump’s presidency strikes at the 
heart of the strategic reorienting of Japan 
undertaken by Abe. Shinto Abe’s policy 
changes have been focused on increasing 
Japan’s capacity to deter regional threats, 
whether posed by North Korea’s nuclear 
program or China’s growing assertiveness 
over the disputed Senkaku Islands 
(territory claimed by Japan but contested 
by China). Increased defence spending 
and a greater emphasis on ‘grey zone’ 
capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces 
have been important to this program. 
Japan has also sought to deepen its 
diplomatic engagement around the 
region, especially through building 
strategic partnerships with countries such 
as Australia and India. 
Yet at the heart of Japan’s more 
‘proactive contribution to peace’ has 
been a strengthening of the US-Japan 
alliance and a strong backing of the US 
“pivot” or “rebalance” strategy towards 
Asia developed under the Obama 
administration. Abe’s reinterpretation of 
the Japanese Constitution to allow for 
collective self-defence (that is, to come 
to the aid of an ally) should be viewed in 
this light. In some ways therefore, Japan 
under Abe has been more ‘pro-pivot’ 
than the United States. 
However, President Trump, both 
during and since last year’s election 
campaign, has raised major questions 
about America’s Asian strategy that throw 
into serious doubt Japan’s rationale 
for deepening its relationship with 
the United States. By arguing on the 
campaign trail that Japan free rides on 
the US and should consider developing 
its own nuclear weapons capability 
rather than relying on America’s nuclear 
guarantee, Trump has reawakened fears 
of abandonment in Tokyo. Such fears are 
compounded by Trump’s transactionalism 
– his belief in being able to ‘do diplomatic 
deals’ – which raises the concern that 
Japan’s security interests will be sidelined 
in the wake of a grand Sino-American 
strategic bargain. 
Conversely, by appearing to 
countenance unilateral American 
intervention in the region’s territorial 
disputes such as over the South China 
Sea, the Trump administration has also 
managed to revive the prospect that 
Tokyo might become dragged into a 
wider Sino-American conflict. Just as the 
Japanese government has loosened the 
domestic restrictions on the country’s 
capacity to act internationally, it is now 
confronted by a United States president 
who eulogises the role of force in 
international affairs. Either way, America’s 
reliability as an ally – notwithstanding 
a recent return to alliance orthodoxy in 
the form of Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis’s confirmation that the Senkaku 
Islands are covered by the United 
States-Japan Security Treaty – is now in 
question. 
Trump’s pronouncements so far 
on economics and trade are even 
more problematic for Abe, since they 
risk undermining Abe’s agenda both 
internationally and domestically. Concern 
in Japan about Trump’s economic agenda 
relates not only to the demise of the 
TPP but also to Trump’s wider attitude 
towards global trade, including America’s 
likely future approach to the World Trade 
Organization, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, trade relations with 
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China and other potential policies such as 
border adjustment taxes. 
Internationally, the TPP was viewed in 
Tokyo as a key part of the United States 
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific because it 
helped link the United States to the region 
across multiple dimensions rather than 
just security. For Japan, the TPP was 
expected both to strengthen economic 
relations on a bilateral basis with the 
United States as well as support greater 
Japanese engagement with the wider 
region, particularly Southeast Asia. 
Domestically, the TPP represented a 
key instrument through which Abe would 
reinvigorate the Japanese economy. 
In particular, it would help deliver 
structural reform, the so-called ‘third 
arrow’ of Abe’s reform agenda known 
as ‘Abenomics.’ Abe’s goal is to effect 
structural reforms to make uncompetitive 
sectors of the Japanese economy, such 
as agriculture, more dynamic. Now that 
this form of “external pressure” (gaiatsu) 
for such reform is gone, however, Abe 
may find such reforms that much harder 
to implement.
What golden golf diplomacy can 
achieve
Abe’s Trump diplomacy has been 
a shrewd mixture of flattery and 
pragmatism. Along with presenting 
golden clubs, Abe has sidestepped 
references to immigration or human 
rights issues. His aim instead has been to 
avoid any major confrontation on trade or 
financial issues such as exchange rates or 
monetary policy. 
This tactic appears to have been 
reasonably successful. In addition to 
gaining the commitment of the Trump 
administration to Japanese security – 
which was aided by North Korea’s missile 
tests during the February Trump-Abe 
summit – Japan has so far kept any 
discord over trade to a minimum. Abe 
has instead promoted a new United 
States-Japan economic dialogue to be 
led by Japanese Minister of Finance Taro 
Aso and United States Vice-President 
Mike Pence. This success perhaps 
explains why domestic criticism of 
Abe’s diplomacy has been muted. The 
strongest criticism of Abe’s approach has 
come from former foreign minister, now 
opposition politician, Seiji Maehara, who 
characterised Abe as “a chicken meekly 
obeying a beast”. 
Yet such early success conceals Abe’s 
weak hand and the broader limitations of 
such diplomacy, however skilfull. Adroit 
diplomacy cannot block the deeper 
structural realignments set off by Trump. 
It cannot, for instance, address the rising 
doubts about the prospects for America’s 
ongoing primacy in the Asia-Pacific. It 
cannot undo the damage Trump has 
done to America’s reputation as a reliable 
ally. Nor can it stem the power shift 
towards China, now a product not merely 
of China’s rise but also of erratic United 
States policy.
Japan’s deeper challenges
Trump therefore exposes the deeper 
strategic challenges facing Japan. More 
than most states in Asia, its strategic 
circumstances involving territorial 
disputes as well as regional rivalry are 
acute. Further, Japan cannot easily 
pivot from a US-based strategy: not 
only is its own influence in Asia based 
heavily on a robust US commitment to 
regional security, but it lacks any realistic 
substitute for American power. 
Ideally, Japan would wish to roll back 
the worst foreign policy excesses of 
the Trump administration. But more 
realistically, it may seek merely to limit 
the damage that may be done to the 
regional order over the next four years. 
Japan is not unique in this respect; similar 
thinking can be found around the region. 
In Australia, for example, Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop points to the fact that many 
states in the region find themselves in 
a “strategic holding pattern”. In the end 
however, if adopting a wait-and-see 
strategy represents optimal policy, Abe’s 
gift of golden clubs could in time be 
seen as less triumph of diplomacy than 
diplomacy in hope. 
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